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PRELIMINARY ~~MORANDU"1 
.'fa\' 15, 1986 Conference 
L i s t 4 , s h ee t ? 
No. 85- 6593 -C..,f+\ 
ALLEN (denied cpc despite Satson 
claim) 
v. 
Cert to C~1 (Esc~bach, Posner, 
?laum) (Order -Jenying cpc) 
Fen . /Civ . (habeas) Timely 
1 . SUl-H·~RY : Petr contends that (l) CA7 erred in refusing 
to issue a certificate oF probable cause in a case that presents 
an issue currently pending before this Court; and (2) the DC 
erred in requiring him to sl-tow " cause" for his failure to produce 
studies detailing systematic exclusion of minority jurors. 
2 . FACTS AND D~CISIONS BELOW: Petr was convicted of two 
murders in Ill . state court and sentenced to concurrent 100- to-
300- year prison terms . P.e argued in state court that he had been 
denied his constitutional r~ght to an impartial jury because the 
prosecutor exercised his oeremptory challenges to exc).ude all 
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from the jury. Relying on Swain v. Alabama , 
380 u.~. 202 (lq65), t~e Ill. App. Ct . rejected this claim on the 
grounn that petr han not shown that the c; tate systemat '-'=ally 
exc!uded blacks and hispanics from juries. 
Raving exhauste~ his state court remedies, petr ~rought this 
habeas action in Federal T>istrict Court (N.D. Ill . , c;hadur). In 
the series of four opinions, the nc (1) postponed consideration 
of the Batson/Swain claim until the Ill. Sup. Ct. necided a then 
pending case concerning the continued vitality of Swain; (2) 
concluded that petr's failure to make even an offer of proof at 
trial of systematic exclusion of minorities over time is a state 
procerlural default; (3) held that petr had failed to show "cause" 
for such f ai lure--petr' s cl a i. ms that his attorneys were una•t~a re 
of the state's attorney's alleged de facto policy of using 
peremptory challenges for the systematic exclusion o~ minorities, 
~d that he lacked the resources to compile an1 analyze the 
necessary statistics, are not sufficient cause for petr's failure 
to have tendered any evidence at all; and (4) adhered to its view 
that petr had waived or abandoned any claim basen on systematic 
exclusion of jurors, but reached the merits of that clai~ "in any 
event," observing that CA7 had twice in the past 60 days rejected 
the identical claim that Swain was no longer good law or did not 
apply to Sixth Amendment challenges , and concluding that petr's 
claim was without merit. 
In a separate order, the D~ denied petr's motion for a 
certificate of probable cause , noting again that CA7 had twice 
reconfirmed the continuing vali~ity of Swain . The court 
' 
- - - . . . . 
~. . . .- ---
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pc lt' ' :.1 n ppP ,, 1 wll:J ni1 t; tztl~ ~~n in "goorl 
ftd t'l" tn1tl \~lltJ "I eqnl I y t r· i vol ouo." 
Cf\7 Jik~\" inc~ t1eclinecl to Issue" cpc, concluf'ling th~t petr 
hoG foi tod t:o rncct the stnnrlarcls set out; in Rarcf:oot v. Estelle , 
4t\:J U.S. 9AO, A!'IJ n. 4 (l C'l81). 
3. rONTBNTION~: (1) The refusal of the courts below to 
pcr·mi t petr to nppcnl flies in the f:ace of: the stanrlarcls 
enuncii'lt.ctl by this Court in Bar<:'foot v. Estell e , supra . .,his 
Court's grl\nt of certiorari. in Batson v. Kentucky, No. o,-15?.63, 
cnnn<.-,t h0 SCJUnJ·ed w;th the OCs "legally frivolous" conclusion. 
rn n:trefoot, the rourt made plain that in order to appeal an 
adverse decision a habeas petr is not requi reo to "show that ~e 
should prevai 1 on the merits. Rather he must demonstrate 
that the issues are nebatable among jurists of reason; that a 
court could resolve the issues {in a different manner1; or that 
the issues are 'adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed 
further.'" 463 u.s., at gq3 n. 4. Each of t~ese standards was 
met in this case, and the refusal of 0.1 to permit petr to appeal 
should be summarily reversed. 
(2) '!'he novel waiver rule app1 ieo hy the nr in this case 
warrants plenary review, either by CA7 or by this Court. At 
trial, petr's counsel objected to the prosecutor's use of 
peremptory challenges to exclude minorities from the petit jury. 
The state appellate court rejected this claim because petr had 
failed to establish the kind of systematic exclusion required by 
~wain. Petr sought an opportunity in this habeas proceeding to 
stablish such systematic exclusion. It is far from clear that a 
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DC mny z:equi rc a showing of "cause an~ prejudice" when, as here, 
the stnte courts have adnressed the merits oE a prisoner's 
claims. Ulster Co. C:::ourt v. AJlen, 442 u.~. 140, 1.49 (1979). 
The appropriateness of review is underscore~ by the refusal of 
the OC to accept as "cause" petr' s unrebutte~ allegation that at 
the time of trial his attorneys were unaware of the prosecutor's 
long-standing practice of systematically excluding minority 
jurors. That this alleged unfamiliarity with an unlawful 
practice should constitute cause is the teaching of Ree~ v. Ross, 
104 s.ct. 2901 (1984). 
4. DI~CUSSION: This petn might be treaten in one of 
several different ways. It seems clear that c~~ would have 
viewed the cpc motion differently ha~ Batson already come down at 
that time. (As far as I can tell, the DC's procedural bar 
holding only went to petr' s Swain systematic exclusion claim; the 
Batson claim was rejected on the ground t~at ~wain was still good 
law.) One option, therefore, would be a (:t:"R and then a GVR in 
light of Batson. 
Four members of the Court (~HE CHIF.F JU~TICE and JUSTICES 
WHITE, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR), however, expressed the view in 
Batson that the decision shoulo not be applied retroactively. In 
addition, JUSTICES !'OWELL and BRENNAN indicated in internal 
memoranda that they agreed or might agree with that view. If the 
Court plans to take a case in order to decit:3e the retroactivity 
question, it probably should hold this case (following a CFR). 
Depending on what else is out there, I think that this might not 
be the best case to take for that purpose, since ~A7 denied cpc 
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plenary conaic!eration to petr• s clai-. 
die eo.-~ decides m lea.e t:he retroactl•i ty ~est ion to tlle 
~-r ~~• f~ ~be tiae being • then I suppose a CPR and t.hen a 
_. tiCMild be the best course. 
% recc: aencJ a CPR in ant.lcipation oE either a holcl or a GVlt. 
%PP status is ~per. 
ftaem 1s no respo•e. 
11ay a. 1H6 lloaltoa 
~ 
opns ia petn 
